Materiały źródłowe

• #1 Epidemiology of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS): adults and children

  https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7106189/

  Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is a newly described respiratory infection with pandemic potential. The causative agent is a new strain of coronavirus most likely originating from wild animals. This disease first emerged in November 2002 in Guangdong Province, China. Early in the outbreak the infection had been transmitted primarily via household contacts and healthcare settings. In late February 2003 the infection was transmitted to Hong Kong when an infected doctor from the mainland visited there. During his stay in Hong Kong at least 17 guests and visitors were infected at the hotel at which he stayed. By modern day air travel, the infection was rapidly spread to other countries including Vietnam, Singapore and Canada by these infected guests. With the implementation of effective control strategies including early isolation of suspected cases, strict infection control measures in the hospital setting, meticulous contact tracing and quarantine, the outbreak was finally brought under control by July 2003. In addition, there were another two events of SARS in China between the end of December 2003 and January 2004 and from March to May 2004; both were readily controlled without significant patient spread.

• #2 Epidemiology of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS): adults and children

  https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7106189/

  The global epidemic began in the Guangdong Province in Southern China in mid-November 2002. The first case of SARS that fulfilled the WHO criteria was reported in Foshan, a city about 20 km from the capital city of the Guangdong Province.2 In December 2002 the second case was reported to be a chef who had regular contact with live caged animals used as game food. In the initial stage of the outbreak the disease was confined to household contacts and healthcare workers who looked after patients with an unusual type of atypical pneumonia of unknown aetiology,3 subsequently known as SARS.4 The World Health Organization (WHO) was first informed on February 11th, 2003, by the Chinese Ministry of Health, of an outbreak of atypical pneumonia of unknown aetiology involving 305 cases and five deaths in the Guangdong Province.5 On March 26, 2003 the Chinese government provided an update of the outbreak in the Guangdong Province. From November 2002 to 28th February, 2003 there were a total of 792 cases with 31 deaths. In the meantime, SARS quickly spread across the country and Beijing was severely affected with an increasing number of new cases. The pattern of spread was fairly consistent. Initially, the infection was confined to household contacts and healthcare workers who had looked after the infected patients without the proper protective equipment. Subsequently, the infected health workers and visitors to the hospital wards brought the infection out of the hospital system, resulting in a massive community outbreak across the country. The rapid spread and exponential increase in the number of cases at the end of January and in early February 2003 was most likely related to movement of people during the Chinese New Year holiday season.2

• #3 Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) | healthdirect

  https://www.healthdirect.gov.au/severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome-sars

  Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is a viral illness that can cause severe pneumonia. […] The virus is spread through close contact with infected people or animals. […] SARS is currently not known to be spreading anywhere in the world. […] There is no cure or vaccine for SARS. […] In case of an outbreak, you can protect yourself with preventative steps, such as handwashing, social distancing and good hygiene. […] An outbreak of the virus that causes SARS began in China in late 2002 and spread to many countries. Australia was not significantly affected. The outbreak was successfully under control by July 2003. The last known case of SARS was reported in China in April 2004. […] Currently, SARS is not known to be spreading anywhere in the world. It’s not known if future outbreaks could happen.

• #4

  https://www.who.int/health-topics/severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome

  Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is a viral respiratory disease caused by a SARS-coronavirus. While SARS cases were detected as early as November 2002 as part of an outbreak that emerged in China and subsequently spread to 28 other countries, the pathogen causing the disease was identified as a coronavirus at the end of February 2003. WHO coordinated the international investigation with the assistance of the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN) and worked closely with health authorities in affected countries to provide epidemiological, clinical and logistical support and to bring the outbreak under control. […] The case fatality among persons with illness meeting the current WHO case definition for confirmed cases of SARS is around 9.6%. […] Controlling outbreaks relies on containment measures including: prompt detection of cases through good surveillance networks and including an early warning system; isolation of suspected or probable cases; tracing to identify both the source of the infection and contacts of those who are sick and may be at risk of contracting the virus; quarantine of suspected contacts for 10 days; exit screening for outgoing passengers from areas with recent local transmission by asking questions and temperature measurement; and disinfection of aircraft and cruise vessels having SARS cases on board using WHO guidelines.

• #5 Epidemiology of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS): adults and children

  https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7106189/

  Among the infected guests at the index hotel in Hong Kong was a Chinese-American businessman who had stayed in a room across the hall from the infected Guangdong doctor. He travelled to Hanoi and became ill while in Vietnam. Dr Carlo Urbani was the first to recognise this new infectious disease and he instituted stringent infection control measures early on in the outbreak in Hanoi. There were only 63 cases with five deaths in Vietnam and it was the first country to be removed from the list of countries with local transmission by the WHO. Unfortunately, Dr Urbani contracted the disease and subsequently died in Thailand where he planned to deliver a scientific presentation.10 […] The outbreak in Singapore started in late February when two infected guests who had stayed in the index hotel in Hong Kong returned home.8 Following the typical pattern of spread within hospitals, the infection spread out to the community. In contrast to the situation in Hong Kong, the health authorities instituted very stringent measures of isolation, contact tracing, home quarantine and closure of schools fairly early on in the outbreak. Therefore, the magnitude of the outbreak was relatively small with a total of only 238 cases. Similarly in Taiwan, SARS was transmitted into the region by travellers who had visited Southern China or Hong Kong. Despite the knowledge of the infection accumulated in Hong Kong and the Mainland, initial control measures were sub-optimal resulting in a major community outbreak. There were a total of 346 cases resulting in 37 deaths and Taiwan was the last region to be removed from the list with recent local transmission. The largest outbreak outside of Asia was in Toronto, Canada when one of the infected guests from the index hotel in Hong Kong returned home in late February 2003.7 The pattern of spread was similar to that in Singapore and Hong Kong. The total toll in Canada was 251 cases and the outbreak finally came under control in early July 2003. Other than the outbreaks mentioned above, 23 other countries have reported cases in people who had recently travelled to the affected regions (Table 1 ).11 Because of the heightened index of suspicion and implementation of proper infection control measures, very few cases in these countries were healthcare workers and the disease did not spread into the communities.

• #6 SEVERE ACUTE RESPIRATORY SYNDROME (SARS)

  https://oeps.wv.gov/sars/pages/default.aspx

  Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is a viral respiratory illness caused by a coronavirus, called SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV). SARS was first reported in Asia in February 2003 and the illness spread to more than two dozen countries in North America, South America, Europe, and Asia before the SARS global outbreak was contained. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), a total of 8,098 people worldwide became sick with SARS during the 2003 outbreak. Of these, 774 died. […] Report suspect or confirmed cases IMMEDIATELY to the local health department by phone and follow up with written report. […] SARS Case Count, Worldwide.

• #7 Epidemiology of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS): adults and children

  https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7106189/

  The global epidemic began in the Guangdong Province in Southern China in mid-November 2002. The first case of SARS that fulfilled the WHO criteria was reported in Foshan, a city about 20 km from the capital city of the Guangdong Province.2 In December 2002 the second case was reported to be a chef who had regular contact with live caged animals used as game food. In the initial stage of the outbreak the disease was confined to household contacts and healthcare workers who looked after patients with an unusual type of atypical pneumonia of unknown aetiology,3 subsequently known as SARS.4 The World Health Organization (WHO) was first informed on February 11th, 2003, by the Chinese Ministry of Health, of an outbreak of atypical pneumonia of unknown aetiology involving 305 cases and five deaths in the Guangdong Province.5 On March 26, 2003 the Chinese government provided an update of the outbreak in the Guangdong Province. From November 2002 to 28th February, 2003 there were a total of 792 cases with 31 deaths. In the meantime, SARS quickly spread across the country and Beijing was severely affected with an increasing number of new cases. The pattern of spread was fairly consistent. Initially, the infection was confined to household contacts and healthcare workers who had looked after the infected patients without the proper protective equipment. Subsequently, the infected health workers and visitors to the hospital wards brought the infection out of the hospital system, resulting in a massive community outbreak across the country. The rapid spread and exponential increase in the number of cases at the end of January and in early February 2003 was most likely related to movement of people during the Chinese New Year holiday season.2

• #8 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome – StatPearls – NCBI Bookshelf

  https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK558977/

  A new and rapidly progressive respiratory syndrome termed severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) was identified by the World Health Organization (WHO) in the Guangdong province of China as a global threat in March of 2003. […] The first severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) cases were noted in the Guangdong province of China in November 2002 as an outbreak of atypical, acute community-acquired pneumonia cases. […] The illness spread rapidly from the Guangdong province and Hong Kong globally to over 30 countries in Asia, Europe, and North America. […] By July of 2003, no new cases were reported worldwide, leading the WHO to lift a travel advisory it had placed and to declare the end of the pandemic. […] SARS-CoV, like many other respiratory viruses, is transmitted predominantly person to person by face-to-face contact suggesting a droplet spread mechanism though also by direct contact with fomites or contaminated secretions.

• #9 Epidemiology of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS): adults and children

  https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7106189/

  The global epidemic began in the Guangdong Province in Southern China in mid-November 2002. The first case of SARS that fulfilled the WHO criteria was reported in Foshan, a city about 20 km from the capital city of the Guangdong Province.2 In December 2002 the second case was reported to be a chef who had regular contact with live caged animals used as game food. In the initial stage of the outbreak the disease was confined to household contacts and healthcare workers who looked after patients with an unusual type of atypical pneumonia of unknown aetiology,3 subsequently known as SARS.4 The World Health Organization (WHO) was first informed on February 11th, 2003, by the Chinese Ministry of Health, of an outbreak of atypical pneumonia of unknown aetiology involving 305 cases and five deaths in the Guangdong Province.5 On March 26, 2003 the Chinese government provided an update of the outbreak in the Guangdong Province. From November 2002 to 28th February, 2003 there were a total of 792 cases with 31 deaths. In the meantime, SARS quickly spread across the country and Beijing was severely affected with an increasing number of new cases. The pattern of spread was fairly consistent. Initially, the infection was confined to household contacts and healthcare workers who had looked after the infected patients without the proper protective equipment. Subsequently, the infected health workers and visitors to the hospital wards brought the infection out of the hospital system, resulting in a massive community outbreak across the country. The rapid spread and exponential increase in the number of cases at the end of January and in early February 2003 was most likely related to movement of people during the Chinese New Year holiday season.2

• #10 Epidemiology of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS): adults and children

  https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7106189/

  With increasing understanding of the condition and the recognition of the magnitude of the problem by the central Chinese government, effective control measures including proper isolation of infected cases, meticulous contact tracing, appropriate quarantine and stringent infection control measures in the healthcare facilities, were introduced. Special designated hospitals in various regions of China were assigned to treat patients with SARS only. The outbreak came under control and the number of new cases gradually declined. On June 24th, 2003 Beijing was removed from the WHO list of areas with recent local transmission of the disease. In the period between November 2002 and June 2003 there were a total of 5327 cases resulting in 348 deaths in mainland China. The crucial incident that led to the pandemic happened in mid-February when an infected doctor travelled to Hong Kong and spread the infection to the other guests and visitors at the hotel where he had stayed for just one night.6

• #11 Epidemiology of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS): adults and children

  https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7106189/

  The epidemic of SARS in Hong Kong began when an infected doctor from Guangzhou came to Hong Kong in mid-February 2003.2 At least 17 visitors and guests at the hotel where he stayed came down with the illness. These infected individuals in turn spread the disease to other cities including Toronto, Singapore and Hanoi.7, 8 One of the infected visitors was admitted to the Prince of Wales Hospital in early March with pneumonia. In just two weeks, 138 healthcare workers, medical students, other patients and visitors to the index ward contracted the disease. The exact reason causing such an extensive outbreak was not clear. It was postulated that the use of the jet nebuliser in the index patient might have generated large amounts of infective droplets in the environment. The infected visitors and patients who had been in the same ward then brought the disease out of the hospital and it spread to the community.

• #12

  https://www.who.int/health-topics/severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome

  Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is a viral respiratory disease caused by a SARS-coronavirus. While SARS cases were detected as early as November 2002 as part of an outbreak that emerged in China and subsequently spread to 28 other countries, the pathogen causing the disease was identified as a coronavirus at the end of February 2003. WHO coordinated the international investigation with the assistance of the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN) and worked closely with health authorities in affected countries to provide epidemiological, clinical and logistical support and to bring the outbreak under control. […] The case fatality among persons with illness meeting the current WHO case definition for confirmed cases of SARS is around 9.6%. […] Controlling outbreaks relies on containment measures including: prompt detection of cases through good surveillance networks and including an early warning system; isolation of suspected or probable cases; tracing to identify both the source of the infection and contacts of those who are sick and may be at risk of contracting the virus; quarantine of suspected contacts for 10 days; exit screening for outgoing passengers from areas with recent local transmission by asking questions and temperature measurement; and disinfection of aircraft and cruise vessels having SARS cases on board using WHO guidelines.

• #13 Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)

  https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome

  SARS is a severe respiratory disease caused by a coronavirus (SARS-CoV-1). […] The first human cases appeared in China in November 2002, but the syndrome was recognized three months later. […] The virus generally spread from person to person through respiratory droplets (coughs and sneezes). […] The last SARS case in humans was detected in 2004. […] The source of SARS-CoV-1 is not completely known but it is believed that the virus jumped from an animal reservoir to humans. […] Bats are considered to be the natural reservoir of the virus, but some animals like civets and ferrets in southern China have been found to carry the virus. […] Recent experiments show that bats, ferrets, and domestic cats can efficiently transmit the virus, suggesting a wide range of animal species may act as sources of infection.

• #14 Epidemiology of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS): adults and children

  https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7106189/

  Another major community outbreak in Hong Kong occurred in the Amoy Garden Apartment complex where over 300 residents were infected. The index case of this outbreak was a chronic renal patient who acquired the infection while staying at the index ward at the Prince of Wales Hospital. He had visited his relatives living at Amoy Gardens a few times. There were several hypotheses that tried to explain the extent of the outbreak. Early environmental investigations suggested that the likely route of spread was via leaky sewage pipes, resulting in an aerosol contaminated with infectious fecal material which escaped into the narrow light well between the buildings. Furthermore, a team of investigators from WHO found that the traps of floor drains in many units were dry, resulting in an open connection to the vertical sewage drainage pipes. As there were exhaust fans in the kitchens and bathrooms, backflow of infectious aerosol might occur when the exhaust fans were running, resulting in spread of the infection into the other units in the same apartment block. Further analyses with the use of airflow-dynamics and computational fluid-dynamics revealed evidence of airborne transmission from the index apartment block to the other apartment blocks.9 The infected residents in turn spread the disease at work or via other social contacts resulting in a territory wide outbreak in Hong Kong. During the outbreak of SARS in 2003, a total of 1755 patients came down with the disease and it claimed 300 lives. At the height of the outbreak, schools and hospitals were closed. Furthermore, the residents of Block E at Amoy Gardens were put under quarantine. With these effective measures along with meticulous infection control in the hospitals, proper isolation of infected cases and contact tracing, the outbreak finally came under control and Hong Kong was removed from the WHO list of areas with local transmission in June 2003.

• #15 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS): Lessons for Future Pandemics | Journal of Ethics | American Medical Association

  https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome-sars-lessons-future-pandemics/2010-09

  Based upon the case clusters from Hong Kong and Canada, SARS appears to spread from person to person and through face-to-face contact, suggesting droplet spread. During the Hong Kong outbreak, for example, almost one-half of patients were infected in clinics, hospitals, or nursing homes, most likely through small droplets that remain suspended in the air. SARS-virus RNA was detected on a variety of hospital surfaces, including computer mice and elevator handrails, during the outbreaks. This can be explained by the excretion of coronavirus in sputum, which can remain in the environment for up to 21 days, and vomit. Other possible transmission vectors are sewage and water, because SARS virus can be excreted in stool for several weeks after symptoms have resolved. […] The severity of SARS and its rapid spread highlighted the need for swift and drastic preventive methods. The WHO issued its first ever travel advisory against nonessential travel to Guangdong Province, China, and Hong Kong in April of 2003—a decision that was quickly supported by the CDC, who even broadened the restricted area and cautioned travelers to Toronto to avoid hospitals or other places in which SARS was likely to be transmitted. The CDC also advised travelers to carry materials for personal protection, such as surgical masks or alcohol-based hand rubs. By late June and early July 2003, the number of SARS cases worldwide had decreased through voluntary quarantines and strict infection control measures, and the WHO began lifting its travel advisories.

• #16 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS): Lessons for Future Pandemics | Journal of Ethics | American Medical Association

  https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome-sars-lessons-future-pandemics/2010-09

  Based upon the case clusters from Hong Kong and Canada, SARS appears to spread from person to person and through face-to-face contact, suggesting droplet spread. During the Hong Kong outbreak, for example, almost one-half of patients were infected in clinics, hospitals, or nursing homes, most likely through small droplets that remain suspended in the air. SARS-virus RNA was detected on a variety of hospital surfaces, including computer mice and elevator handrails, during the outbreaks. This can be explained by the excretion of coronavirus in sputum, which can remain in the environment for up to 21 days, and vomit. Other possible transmission vectors are sewage and water, because SARS virus can be excreted in stool for several weeks after symptoms have resolved. […] The severity of SARS and its rapid spread highlighted the need for swift and drastic preventive methods. The WHO issued its first ever travel advisory against nonessential travel to Guangdong Province, China, and Hong Kong in April of 2003—a decision that was quickly supported by the CDC, who even broadened the restricted area and cautioned travelers to Toronto to avoid hospitals or other places in which SARS was likely to be transmitted. The CDC also advised travelers to carry materials for personal protection, such as surgical masks or alcohol-based hand rubs. By late June and early July 2003, the number of SARS cases worldwide had decreased through voluntary quarantines and strict infection control measures, and the WHO began lifting its travel advisories.

• #17 Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)

  https://www.health.vic.gov.au/infectious-diseases/severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome-sars

  Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is an urgent notifiable condition that must be notified immediately to the department by medical practitioners and pathology services. […] The world experienced the first SARS epidemic in 2003. […] Health authorities are vigilant in SARS surveillance, so that any other outbreaks would quickly be detected. […] SARS is a severe lower respiratory tract infection, recognised in a 2003 epidemic. […] The overall case-fatality rate was approximately 10 per cent and was highest (50 per cent) in those over 60 years of age. […] WHO declared the outbreak interrupted on 5 July 2003, at which time there had been more than 8,400 cases and approximately 900 deaths. […] SARS CoV is not thought to be transmissible during the asymptomatic incubation period, and there has been no evidence that the virus has been spread 10 days after fever has resolved.

• #18 Epidemiology of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS): adults and children

  https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7106189/

  Among the infected guests at the index hotel in Hong Kong was a Chinese-American businessman who had stayed in a room across the hall from the infected Guangdong doctor. He travelled to Hanoi and became ill while in Vietnam. Dr Carlo Urbani was the first to recognise this new infectious disease and he instituted stringent infection control measures early on in the outbreak in Hanoi. There were only 63 cases with five deaths in Vietnam and it was the first country to be removed from the list of countries with local transmission by the WHO. Unfortunately, Dr Urbani contracted the disease and subsequently died in Thailand where he planned to deliver a scientific presentation.10 […] The outbreak in Singapore started in late February when two infected guests who had stayed in the index hotel in Hong Kong returned home.8 Following the typical pattern of spread within hospitals, the infection spread out to the community. In contrast to the situation in Hong Kong, the health authorities instituted very stringent measures of isolation, contact tracing, home quarantine and closure of schools fairly early on in the outbreak. Therefore, the magnitude of the outbreak was relatively small with a total of only 238 cases. Similarly in Taiwan, SARS was transmitted into the region by travellers who had visited Southern China or Hong Kong. Despite the knowledge of the infection accumulated in Hong Kong and the Mainland, initial control measures were sub-optimal resulting in a major community outbreak. There were a total of 346 cases resulting in 37 deaths and Taiwan was the last region to be removed from the list with recent local transmission. The largest outbreak outside of Asia was in Toronto, Canada when one of the infected guests from the index hotel in Hong Kong returned home in late February 2003.7 The pattern of spread was similar to that in Singapore and Hong Kong. The total toll in Canada was 251 cases and the outbreak finally came under control in early July 2003. Other than the outbreaks mentioned above, 23 other countries have reported cases in people who had recently travelled to the affected regions (Table 1 ).11 Because of the heightened index of suspicion and implementation of proper infection control measures, very few cases in these countries were healthcare workers and the disease did not spread into the communities.

• #19 About SARS – MN Dept. of Health

  https://www.health.state.mn.us/diseases/sars/basics.html

  Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is a viral respiratory illness that first emerged in China in November 2002, and later spread through international travel to 29 countries worldwide causing large outbreaks in Hong Kong; Taiwan; Singapore; Hanoi, Vietnam; and Toronto, Canada. According to the World Health Organization (WHO), from November 2002 to July 31, 2003, there were 8,098 cases of SARS; of these, 774 died. […] On October 1, 2003, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), reported that there were 164 probable and suspect SARS cases in the United States, of which only eight had laboratory evidence of SARS. There were no deaths due to SARS in the US. Most of the U.S. SARS cases were among travelers returning from other parts of the world with SARS. […] For a severe respiratory illness to be SARS, there has to be a history of travel to a SARS affected area or close personal contact with a person with SARS, within ten days before symptoms start, this is called the epidemiological link.

• #20 Epidemiology of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS): adults and children

  https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7106189/

  With increasing understanding of the condition and the recognition of the magnitude of the problem by the central Chinese government, effective control measures including proper isolation of infected cases, meticulous contact tracing, appropriate quarantine and stringent infection control measures in the healthcare facilities, were introduced. Special designated hospitals in various regions of China were assigned to treat patients with SARS only. The outbreak came under control and the number of new cases gradually declined. On June 24th, 2003 Beijing was removed from the WHO list of areas with recent local transmission of the disease. In the period between November 2002 and June 2003 there were a total of 5327 cases resulting in 348 deaths in mainland China. The crucial incident that led to the pandemic happened in mid-February when an infected doctor travelled to Hong Kong and spread the infection to the other guests and visitors at the hotel where he had stayed for just one night.6

• #21 Epidemiology of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS): adults and children

  https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7106189/

  Another major community outbreak in Hong Kong occurred in the Amoy Garden Apartment complex where over 300 residents were infected. The index case of this outbreak was a chronic renal patient who acquired the infection while staying at the index ward at the Prince of Wales Hospital. He had visited his relatives living at Amoy Gardens a few times. There were several hypotheses that tried to explain the extent of the outbreak. Early environmental investigations suggested that the likely route of spread was via leaky sewage pipes, resulting in an aerosol contaminated with infectious fecal material which escaped into the narrow light well between the buildings. Furthermore, a team of investigators from WHO found that the traps of floor drains in many units were dry, resulting in an open connection to the vertical sewage drainage pipes. As there were exhaust fans in the kitchens and bathrooms, backflow of infectious aerosol might occur when the exhaust fans were running, resulting in spread of the infection into the other units in the same apartment block. Further analyses with the use of airflow-dynamics and computational fluid-dynamics revealed evidence of airborne transmission from the index apartment block to the other apartment blocks.9 The infected residents in turn spread the disease at work or via other social contacts resulting in a territory wide outbreak in Hong Kong. During the outbreak of SARS in 2003, a total of 1755 patients came down with the disease and it claimed 300 lives. At the height of the outbreak, schools and hospitals were closed. Furthermore, the residents of Block E at Amoy Gardens were put under quarantine. With these effective measures along with meticulous infection control in the hospitals, proper isolation of infected cases and contact tracing, the outbreak finally came under control and Hong Kong was removed from the WHO list of areas with local transmission in June 2003.

• #22 Epidemiology of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS): adults and children

  https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7106189/

  Among the infected guests at the index hotel in Hong Kong was a Chinese-American businessman who had stayed in a room across the hall from the infected Guangdong doctor. He travelled to Hanoi and became ill while in Vietnam. Dr Carlo Urbani was the first to recognise this new infectious disease and he instituted stringent infection control measures early on in the outbreak in Hanoi. There were only 63 cases with five deaths in Vietnam and it was the first country to be removed from the list of countries with local transmission by the WHO. Unfortunately, Dr Urbani contracted the disease and subsequently died in Thailand where he planned to deliver a scientific presentation.10 […] The outbreak in Singapore started in late February when two infected guests who had stayed in the index hotel in Hong Kong returned home.8 Following the typical pattern of spread within hospitals, the infection spread out to the community. In contrast to the situation in Hong Kong, the health authorities instituted very stringent measures of isolation, contact tracing, home quarantine and closure of schools fairly early on in the outbreak. Therefore, the magnitude of the outbreak was relatively small with a total of only 238 cases. Similarly in Taiwan, SARS was transmitted into the region by travellers who had visited Southern China or Hong Kong. Despite the knowledge of the infection accumulated in Hong Kong and the Mainland, initial control measures were sub-optimal resulting in a major community outbreak. There were a total of 346 cases resulting in 37 deaths and Taiwan was the last region to be removed from the list with recent local transmission. The largest outbreak outside of Asia was in Toronto, Canada when one of the infected guests from the index hotel in Hong Kong returned home in late February 2003.7 The pattern of spread was similar to that in Singapore and Hong Kong. The total toll in Canada was 251 cases and the outbreak finally came under control in early July 2003. Other than the outbreaks mentioned above, 23 other countries have reported cases in people who had recently travelled to the affected regions (Table 1 ).11 Because of the heightened index of suspicion and implementation of proper infection control measures, very few cases in these countries were healthcare workers and the disease did not spread into the communities.

• #23

  https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5249a2.htm

  During the 2003 epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), CDC and the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE) developed surveillance criteria to identify persons with SARS. […] The revised SARS case definition modifies the clinical, epidemiologic, laboratory, and case-exclusion criteria in the U.S. surveillance case definition used during the 2003 epidemic. […] The revised case definition also classifies each SARS case as either a SARS report under investigation (SARS RUI) or SARS-CoV disease. […] During November 2002–July 2003, a total of 8,098 probable SARS cases were reported to the World Health Organization (WHO) from 29 countries, including 29 cases from the United States; 774 SARS-related deaths (case-fatality rate: 9.6%) were reported, none of which occurred in the United States.

• #24 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)

  https://www.health.ny.gov/diseases/communicable/sars/fact_sheet.htm

  Through July 2003, a total of 192 SARS cases had been reported in the United States, including 159 suspect and 33 probable cases; of the 33 probable cases only 8 had laboratory evidence of the SARS virus. No SARS-related deaths occurred in the U.S. SARS cases reported in the U.S. occurred primarily among people who traveled to SARS-affected areas; a small number of people became ill after being in close contact with (having cared for or lived with) a SARS patient while in the U.S. […] To minimize the risk for SARS among U.S. residents, the public health system took careful and thorough precautions to prevent the spread of SARS. People who were suspected of having SARS were isolated from others and received care. People arriving from affected parts of the world (who might have been exposed to SARS) received information about SARS and instructions on what they should do if they became ill. SARS patients and their contacts were monitored to help prevent spread of the disease.

• #25 Epidemiology of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS): adults and children

  https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7106189/

  The demography of the patients from different parts of the world showed several consistent features. As a large proportion of the patients were healthcare workers, most of them were relatively young. The reported median age of the patients was mostly under 50 years.12 There was a slight female predominance as many of the infected healthcare workers were nurses. In Hong Kong and Singapore, 22% and 41% of the patients were healthcare workers respectively. Infection among children and adolescents was relatively uncommon. Only 6% of all SARS cases from Hong Kong were under 18 years of age. Almost all infected children had close contact with an infected adult in the same household. It is interesting to note that many children were attending schools up until they were admitted to hospital with respiratory symptoms or fever, there has not been any case of spread in the school setting in Hong Kong. For the initial cohort of infected adults admitted to the Prince of Wales hospital, only 5% of close family contacts were infected. This suggests that patients are non-infectious while they are incubating the disease. In Hong Kong the majority of the infected children were associated with the outbreaks at the Prince of Wales Hospital or Amoy Gardens Apartments complex.

• #26 Epidemiology of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS): adults and children

  https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7106189/

  The demography of the patients from different parts of the world showed several consistent features. As a large proportion of the patients were healthcare workers, most of them were relatively young. The reported median age of the patients was mostly under 50 years.12 There was a slight female predominance as many of the infected healthcare workers were nurses. In Hong Kong and Singapore, 22% and 41% of the patients were healthcare workers respectively. Infection among children and adolescents was relatively uncommon. Only 6% of all SARS cases from Hong Kong were under 18 years of age. Almost all infected children had close contact with an infected adult in the same household. It is interesting to note that many children were attending schools up until they were admitted to hospital with respiratory symptoms or fever, there has not been any case of spread in the school setting in Hong Kong. For the initial cohort of infected adults admitted to the Prince of Wales hospital, only 5% of close family contacts were infected. This suggests that patients are non-infectious while they are incubating the disease. In Hong Kong the majority of the infected children were associated with the outbreaks at the Prince of Wales Hospital or Amoy Gardens Apartments complex.

• #27 Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) | Communicable Diseases Agency

  https://www.cda.gov.sg/professionals/diseases/severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome

  Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) is a viral respiratory illness caused by SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV). […] SARS first occurred in Guangdong, China in 2002, and spread worldwide the following year. By the end of July 2003, a total of 8,096 cases were reported in 29 countries, with 774 deaths, representing a Case Fatality Rate of 9.6%. […] In Singapore, 238 cases with 33 deaths were reported in March to May 2003. The median age of all cases was 36 (ranging from 4 to 90) years; 41% of infections involved healthcare workers. […] SARS primarily transmits through inhalation or direct deposition of infectious respiratory particles (IRPs) such as when an infected person coughs or sneezes. […] Detection of SARS-CoV in respiratory samples including throat and nasopharyngeal swabs, endotracheal aspirate and bronchoalveolar lavage through Polymerase chain reaction, sequencing, virus isolation or four-fold rise in antibody titres. […] Clinical management is symptomatic and supportive treatment for all cases. […] SARS is a legally notifiable disease in Singapore.

• #28

  https://www.who.int/health-topics/severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome

  Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is a viral respiratory disease caused by a SARS-coronavirus. While SARS cases were detected as early as November 2002 as part of an outbreak that emerged in China and subsequently spread to 28 other countries, the pathogen causing the disease was identified as a coronavirus at the end of February 2003. WHO coordinated the international investigation with the assistance of the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN) and worked closely with health authorities in affected countries to provide epidemiological, clinical and logistical support and to bring the outbreak under control. […] The case fatality among persons with illness meeting the current WHO case definition for confirmed cases of SARS is around 9.6%. […] Controlling outbreaks relies on containment measures including: prompt detection of cases through good surveillance networks and including an early warning system; isolation of suspected or probable cases; tracing to identify both the source of the infection and contacts of those who are sick and may be at risk of contracting the virus; quarantine of suspected contacts for 10 days; exit screening for outgoing passengers from areas with recent local transmission by asking questions and temperature measurement; and disinfection of aircraft and cruise vessels having SARS cases on board using WHO guidelines.

• #29 SARS – Wikipedia

  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SARS

  Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is a viral respiratory disease of zoonotic origin caused by the virus SARS-CoV-1, the first identified strain of the SARS-related coronavirus. The first known cases occurred in November 2002, and the syndrome caused the 2002-2004 SARS outbreak. SARS was a relatively rare disease; at the end of the epidemic in June 2003, the incidence was 8,422 cases with a case fatality rate (CFR) of 11%. No cases of SARS-CoV-1 have been reported worldwide since 2004. […] The case fatality rate (CFR) ranges from 0% to 50% depending on the age group of the patient. Patients under 24 were least likely to die (less than 1%); those 65 and older were most likely to die (over 55%). As with MERS and COVID-19, SARS resulted in significantly more deaths of males than females.

• #30 SARS – Wikipedia

  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SARS

  Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is a viral respiratory disease of zoonotic origin caused by the virus SARS-CoV-1, the first identified strain of the SARS-related coronavirus. The first known cases occurred in November 2002, and the syndrome caused the 2002-2004 SARS outbreak. SARS was a relatively rare disease; at the end of the epidemic in June 2003, the incidence was 8,422 cases with a case fatality rate (CFR) of 11%. No cases of SARS-CoV-1 have been reported worldwide since 2004. […] The case fatality rate (CFR) ranges from 0% to 50% depending on the age group of the patient. Patients under 24 were least likely to die (less than 1%); those 65 and older were most likely to die (over 55%). As with MERS and COVID-19, SARS resulted in significantly more deaths of males than females.

• #31 SARS: symptoms, treatment, prevention – Institut Pasteur

  https://www.pasteur.fr/en/medical-center/disease-sheets/sars

  SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) was the first severe transmissible disease to emerge in the 21st century. The outbreak that began in China in late 2002 spread worldwide in 2003, with more than 8,000 cases and nearly 800 deaths. […] WHO considers the overall mortality rate to be 15%, although it can exceed 50% in people over the age of 65. […] SARS was soon identified as spreading between humans via airborne transmission, probably in droplets of contaminated saliva. It rapidly spread worldwide as a result of air transport, with the most significant outbreaks being concentrated in major airport hubs or areas with high population density. […] The international laboratory network (including the WHO Collaborating Center for Research and Reference on Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses, in the Molecular Genetics of Respiratory Viruses Unit at the Institut Pasteur), tasked by WHO to identify the causative agent for SARS and to develop a diagnostic test, discovered a virus that was completely unknown to scientists.

• #32

  https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/case-definitions-for-surveillance-of-severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome-(sars)

  Objective To describe the epidemiology of SARS and to monitor the magnitude and the spread of this disease, in order to provide advice on prevention and control. […] At this time, WHO is maintaining surveillance for clinically apparent cases only ie probable and suspect cases of SARS. […] Cases that meet the surveillance case definition for SARS should not be discarded on the basis of negative laboratory tests at this time. […] The reason for retaining the clinical and epidemiological basis for the case definitions is that at present there is no validated, widely and consistently available test for infection with the SARS coronavirus.

• #33 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome-associated Coronavirus Disease (SARS-CoV) Revised July 1, 2003 | CDC

  https://ndc.services.cdc.gov/case-definitions/severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome-associated-coronavirus-disease-2003-07-01/

  Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome-associated Coronavirus Disease (SARS-CoV) Case Definition […] A surveillance case definition is a set of uniform criteria used to define a disease for public health surveillance. Surveillance case definitions enable public health officials to classify and count cases consistently across reporting jurisdictions. […] Tests to detect SARS-CoV are being refined and their performance characteristics assessed; therefore, criteria for laboratory diagnosis of SARS-CoV are changing. The following are general criteria for laboratory confirmation of SARS-CoV: […] One or more of the following exposures in the 10 days before onset of symptoms: Close contact with a person with confirmed SARS-CoV disease, […] A case may be excluded as a SARS report under investigation (SARS RUI), including as a CDC-defined probable SARS-CoV case, if any of the following apply: An alternative diagnosis can explain the illness fully,

• #34 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome-associated Coronavirus Disease (SARS-CoV) Revised July 1, 2003 | CDC

  https://ndc.services.cdc.gov/case-definitions/severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome-associated-coronavirus-disease-2003-07-01/

  Reports in persons from areas where SARS activity is occurring […] SARS-CoV disease should be considered at a minimum in the differential diagnoses for persons requiring hospitalization for pneumonia confirmed radiographically or acute respiratory distress syndrome without identifiable etiology and who have one of the following risk factors in the 10 days before the onset of illness: Travel to mainland China, Hong Kong, or Taiwan, or close contact with an ill person with a history of recent travel to one of these areas, […] During the 2003 SARS epidemic, CDC case definitions were the following: Suspect case […] Probable case: Meets the clinical criteria for severe respiratory illness and the epidemiologic criteria for possible exposure to SARS-CoV but does not meet any of the laboratory criteria and exclusion criteria.

• #35 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome-associated Coronavirus Disease (SARS-CoV) Revised July 1, 2003 | CDC

  https://ndc.services.cdc.gov/case-definitions/severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome-associated-coronavirus-disease-2003-07-01/

  Reports in persons from areas where SARS activity is occurring […] SARS-CoV disease should be considered at a minimum in the differential diagnoses for persons requiring hospitalization for pneumonia confirmed radiographically or acute respiratory distress syndrome without identifiable etiology and who have one of the following risk factors in the 10 days before the onset of illness: Travel to mainland China, Hong Kong, or Taiwan, or close contact with an ill person with a history of recent travel to one of these areas, […] During the 2003 SARS epidemic, CDC case definitions were the following: Suspect case […] Probable case: Meets the clinical criteria for severe respiratory illness and the epidemiologic criteria for possible exposure to SARS-CoV but does not meet any of the laboratory criteria and exclusion criteria.

• #36

  https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm5249a2.htm

  During the 2003 epidemic of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS), CDC and the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists (CSTE) developed surveillance criteria to identify persons with SARS. […] The revised SARS case definition modifies the clinical, epidemiologic, laboratory, and case-exclusion criteria in the U.S. surveillance case definition used during the 2003 epidemic. […] The revised case definition also classifies each SARS case as either a SARS report under investigation (SARS RUI) or SARS-CoV disease. […] During November 2002–July 2003, a total of 8,098 probable SARS cases were reported to the World Health Organization (WHO) from 29 countries, including 29 cases from the United States; 774 SARS-related deaths (case-fatality rate: 9.6%) were reported, none of which occurred in the United States.

• #37

  https://www.who.int/publications/m/item/case-definitions-for-surveillance-of-severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome-(sars)

  Objective To describe the epidemiology of SARS and to monitor the magnitude and the spread of this disease, in order to provide advice on prevention and control. […] At this time, WHO is maintaining surveillance for clinically apparent cases only ie probable and suspect cases of SARS. […] Cases that meet the surveillance case definition for SARS should not be discarded on the basis of negative laboratory tests at this time. […] The reason for retaining the clinical and epidemiological basis for the case definitions is that at present there is no validated, widely and consistently available test for infection with the SARS coronavirus.

• #38 Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) | Communicable Diseases Agency

  https://www.cda.gov.sg/professionals/diseases/severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome

  Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) is a viral respiratory illness caused by SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV). […] SARS first occurred in Guangdong, China in 2002, and spread worldwide the following year. By the end of July 2003, a total of 8,096 cases were reported in 29 countries, with 774 deaths, representing a Case Fatality Rate of 9.6%. […] In Singapore, 238 cases with 33 deaths were reported in March to May 2003. The median age of all cases was 36 (ranging from 4 to 90) years; 41% of infections involved healthcare workers. […] SARS primarily transmits through inhalation or direct deposition of infectious respiratory particles (IRPs) such as when an infected person coughs or sneezes. […] Detection of SARS-CoV in respiratory samples including throat and nasopharyngeal swabs, endotracheal aspirate and bronchoalveolar lavage through Polymerase chain reaction, sequencing, virus isolation or four-fold rise in antibody titres. […] Clinical management is symptomatic and supportive treatment for all cases. […] SARS is a legally notifiable disease in Singapore.

• #39

  https://www.who.int/health-topics/severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome

  Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is a viral respiratory disease caused by a SARS-coronavirus. While SARS cases were detected as early as November 2002 as part of an outbreak that emerged in China and subsequently spread to 28 other countries, the pathogen causing the disease was identified as a coronavirus at the end of February 2003. WHO coordinated the international investigation with the assistance of the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN) and worked closely with health authorities in affected countries to provide epidemiological, clinical and logistical support and to bring the outbreak under control. […] The case fatality among persons with illness meeting the current WHO case definition for confirmed cases of SARS is around 9.6%. […] Controlling outbreaks relies on containment measures including: prompt detection of cases through good surveillance networks and including an early warning system; isolation of suspected or probable cases; tracing to identify both the source of the infection and contacts of those who are sick and may be at risk of contracting the virus; quarantine of suspected contacts for 10 days; exit screening for outgoing passengers from areas with recent local transmission by asking questions and temperature measurement; and disinfection of aircraft and cruise vessels having SARS cases on board using WHO guidelines.

• #40

  https://www.who.int/health-topics/severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome

  Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is a viral respiratory disease caused by a SARS-coronavirus. While SARS cases were detected as early as November 2002 as part of an outbreak that emerged in China and subsequently spread to 28 other countries, the pathogen causing the disease was identified as a coronavirus at the end of February 2003. WHO coordinated the international investigation with the assistance of the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN) and worked closely with health authorities in affected countries to provide epidemiological, clinical and logistical support and to bring the outbreak under control. […] The case fatality among persons with illness meeting the current WHO case definition for confirmed cases of SARS is around 9.6%. […] Controlling outbreaks relies on containment measures including: prompt detection of cases through good surveillance networks and including an early warning system; isolation of suspected or probable cases; tracing to identify both the source of the infection and contacts of those who are sick and may be at risk of contracting the virus; quarantine of suspected contacts for 10 days; exit screening for outgoing passengers from areas with recent local transmission by asking questions and temperature measurement; and disinfection of aircraft and cruise vessels having SARS cases on board using WHO guidelines.

• #41 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) | UNDRR

  https://www.undrr.org/understanding-disaster-risk/terminology/hips/bi0068

  The incubation period of SARS is usually 2 to 7 days but may be as long as 10 days (WHO, 2020). […] The case fatality among persons with illness meeting the current WHO case definition for probable and suspected cases of SARS is around 3% (WHO, 2020). […] The WHO has published guidance on case classification and surveillance standards (WHO, 2003a). […] Control of SARS relies on the rapid identification of cases and their appropriate management, including the isolation of suspect and probable cases and the management of their close contacts (WHO, 2019). […] To further reduce the risk that travellers may carry the SARS virus to new areas, international travellers departing from areas with local transmission should be screened for possible SARS at the point of departure (WHO, 2003b). […] Controlling outbreaks relies on containment measures including: prompt detection of cases through good surveillance networks and including an early warning system; isolation of suspected or probable cases; tracing to identify both the source of the infection and contacts of those who are sick and may be at risk of contracting the virus; quarantine of suspected contacts for 10 days; exit screening for outgoing passengers from areas with recent local transmission by asking questions and temperature measurement; and disinfection of aircraft and cruise vessels having SARS cases on board using WHO guidelines (WHO, 2020).

• #42 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS): Lessons for Future Pandemics | Journal of Ethics | American Medical Association

  https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome-sars-lessons-future-pandemics/2010-09

  Based upon the case clusters from Hong Kong and Canada, SARS appears to spread from person to person and through face-to-face contact, suggesting droplet spread. During the Hong Kong outbreak, for example, almost one-half of patients were infected in clinics, hospitals, or nursing homes, most likely through small droplets that remain suspended in the air. SARS-virus RNA was detected on a variety of hospital surfaces, including computer mice and elevator handrails, during the outbreaks. This can be explained by the excretion of coronavirus in sputum, which can remain in the environment for up to 21 days, and vomit. Other possible transmission vectors are sewage and water, because SARS virus can be excreted in stool for several weeks after symptoms have resolved. […] The severity of SARS and its rapid spread highlighted the need for swift and drastic preventive methods. The WHO issued its first ever travel advisory against nonessential travel to Guangdong Province, China, and Hong Kong in April of 2003—a decision that was quickly supported by the CDC, who even broadened the restricted area and cautioned travelers to Toronto to avoid hospitals or other places in which SARS was likely to be transmitted. The CDC also advised travelers to carry materials for personal protection, such as surgical masks or alcohol-based hand rubs. By late June and early July 2003, the number of SARS cases worldwide had decreased through voluntary quarantines and strict infection control measures, and the WHO began lifting its travel advisories.

• #43 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS): Lessons for Future Pandemics | Journal of Ethics | American Medical Association

  https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome-sars-lessons-future-pandemics/2010-09

  For any future outbreaks of SARS or similar respiratory illness, it will be imperative to isolate hospitalized patients in negative pressure rooms, which draw air in (rather than letting it out) when opened, helping to control contagion. Since the past outbreak was spread by HCWs, infection control measures, such as droplet precautions, are of particular importance. HCWs and visitors should wear surgical masks to prevent airborne and droplet acquisition; these can be discarded into the nonregulated waste stream if they do not have blood or bodily fluids on them. Furthermore, HCWs should be barred from work if they develop fever or respiratory symptoms within 10 days of exposure to SARS and should remain on sick leave for a full 10 days after fever and respiratory symptoms have resolved. However, HCWs are not advised to remain home during the 10-day incubation period for SARS if they have no symptoms.

• #44 Information Regarding Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) | Occupational Safety and Health Administration

  https://www.osha.gov/emergency-preparedness/sars

  The CDC provides recommendations for those handling human remains of SARS patients. […] All employees with potential occupational exposure to SARS, as described in this document, should be trained on the hazards associated with that exposure and on the protocols in place in their facilities to isolate and report cases and to reduce exposures. […] If an employee experiences a fever and respiratory symptoms after contact with a patient known to be infected with SARS, the CDC recommends that the employee be excluded from duty. […] As more information becomes available, updates may be added to information on the CDC’s SARS web site.

• #45

  https://www.who.int/health-topics/severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome

  Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is a viral respiratory disease caused by a SARS-coronavirus. While SARS cases were detected as early as November 2002 as part of an outbreak that emerged in China and subsequently spread to 28 other countries, the pathogen causing the disease was identified as a coronavirus at the end of February 2003. WHO coordinated the international investigation with the assistance of the Global Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN) and worked closely with health authorities in affected countries to provide epidemiological, clinical and logistical support and to bring the outbreak under control. […] The case fatality among persons with illness meeting the current WHO case definition for confirmed cases of SARS is around 9.6%. […] Controlling outbreaks relies on containment measures including: prompt detection of cases through good surveillance networks and including an early warning system; isolation of suspected or probable cases; tracing to identify both the source of the infection and contacts of those who are sick and may be at risk of contracting the virus; quarantine of suspected contacts for 10 days; exit screening for outgoing passengers from areas with recent local transmission by asking questions and temperature measurement; and disinfection of aircraft and cruise vessels having SARS cases on board using WHO guidelines.

• #46 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)

  https://www.health.ny.gov/diseases/communicable/sars/fact_sheet.htm

  New York State is preparing for the possible reappearance of SARS by: educating healthcare workers about SARS diagnosis and reporting, developing SARS surveillance systems to determine if and where SARS has re-emerged, developing guidelines for preventing transmission in different settings, and improving laboratory tests for SARS.

• #47 SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) – Taiwan Centers for Disease Control

  https://www.cdc.gov.tw/En/Category/ListContent/bg0g_VU_Ysrgkes_KRUDgQ?uaid=u1D6dRGtmP4Q5YA1GmSKIw

  There were 664 SARS probable cases during the period of March to June, 2003 in Taiwan. […] According to the newest SARS definition of WHO, CDC of Taiwan reclassified the SARS probable cases by the results of PCR and serological testing in order to verify the prevalence of SARS in Taiwan. […] After reclassification, 346 were either SARS PCR positive or antibody positive, so called SARS CoV(+) cases. Among 346 SARS CoV(+) cases, 73 (21%) were deceased, including 37 (10.7%) were directly due to SARS and 36 were SARS related diseases. […] On December 16, 2003, Tri-Service General Hospital had notified a SARS infection case. It was caused by misconduct in the laboratory after investigation. The patient had left the hospital after treatment on December 30. […] Taiwan National Infectious Disease Statistics System […] Surveillance: case detection and reporting. […] Case management: infection control, isolation, treatment and follow up. […] Management of contacts. […] Education. […] Travel advice. […] Laboratory diagnosis. […] International collaborations. […] Research and development.

• #48 SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) – Taiwan Centers for Disease Control

  https://www.cdc.gov.tw/En/Category/ListContent/bg0g_VU_Ysrgkes_KRUDgQ?uaid=u1D6dRGtmP4Q5YA1GmSKIw

  There were 664 SARS probable cases during the period of March to June, 2003 in Taiwan. […] According to the newest SARS definition of WHO, CDC of Taiwan reclassified the SARS probable cases by the results of PCR and serological testing in order to verify the prevalence of SARS in Taiwan. […] After reclassification, 346 were either SARS PCR positive or antibody positive, so called SARS CoV(+) cases. Among 346 SARS CoV(+) cases, 73 (21%) were deceased, including 37 (10.7%) were directly due to SARS and 36 were SARS related diseases. […] On December 16, 2003, Tri-Service General Hospital had notified a SARS infection case. It was caused by misconduct in the laboratory after investigation. The patient had left the hospital after treatment on December 30. […] Taiwan National Infectious Disease Statistics System […] Surveillance: case detection and reporting. […] Case management: infection control, isolation, treatment and follow up. […] Management of contacts. […] Education. […] Travel advice. […] Laboratory diagnosis. […] International collaborations. […] Research and development.

• #49 Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) | Australian Government Department of Health and Aged Care

  https://www.health.gov.au/diseases/severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome-sars

  Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is an illness caused by the SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV). […] SARS is a nationally notifiable disease. […] We monitor cases through the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS).

• #50 Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) | Australian Government Department of Health and Aged Care

  https://www.health.gov.au/diseases/severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome-sars

  Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is an illness caused by the SARS-associated coronavirus (SARS-CoV). […] SARS is a nationally notifiable disease. […] We monitor cases through the National Notifiable Diseases Surveillance System (NNDSS).

• #51 Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) | healthdirect

  https://www.healthdirect.gov.au/severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome-sars

  About 1 in 10 people infected with SARS have died. People who are older or have chronic health conditions are at higher risk. This is due to lower immunity and underlying health conditions. […] SARS is a notifiable disease, meaning a positive result must be reported to public health authorities. The Department of Health will track all cases to monitor outbreaks and improve healthcare responses. […] Because SARS is contagious, you will need to be in isolation so you don’t spread the disease. This isolation may take place at home or in a hospital. You are generally considered no longer contagious 10 days after your symptoms have gone. […] While there is no vaccine for SARS, there are steps you can take to reduce the risk of infection. […] During an outbreak, public health authorities will trace contacts of people with SARS and inform those who need to isolate. Follow the advice and instructions from your local public health department.

• #52 Epidemiology of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS): adults and children

  https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7106189/

  Among areas with larger outbreaks, Hong Kong and Canada had the highest case-fatality rate of 17%.13 Mortality is increased in those with pre-existing illness and those in the older age group. Young children had much milder disease and they usually recovered uneventfully. A small proportion of adolescent patients, however, may develop more severe disease similar to the disease in adults. In Hong Kong there were five pregnant women infected with SARS but none of the neonates was found to have evidence of infection after the delivery despite extensive investigations.14 […] With the advance of modern molecular biological techniques, scientists are able to trace the possible origin of the virus and the spread of infection. Early in the outbreak of SARS the WHO quickly established a laboratory network around the world to facilitate the collaboration in search of the responsible infectious agent.15 The causative agent of SARS was identified as a newly described strain of coronavirus.16, 17 Within just 2 months of the outbreak in Hong Kong, the genome of the virus was completely sequenced and it has very low homologies to all known coronaviruses.18 Subsequent investigations of wild animals and animal traders suggested that the virus originated from wild animals such as the palm civet and raccoon dog that have been hunted for consumption as a delicacy.19 Therefore, the SARS coronavirus most likely represents a new virus introduced to humans by interspecies transmission. From the genomic sequential analysis of 61 SARS coronavirus derived from the early, middle and late phase of the SARS epidemic in the mainland of China, it was again found that the earliest genotypes were similar to the animal SARS-like coronavirus. Major deletions were observed in the open reading frame 8 (Orf8) region of the genome, both at the start and the end of the epidemic. The neutral mutation rate of the viral genome was constant but the amino acid substitution rate of the coding sequences slowed down during the course of the epidemic. The spike protein showed the strongest initial responses to positive selection pressures, followed by subsequent purifying selection and eventual stabilisation. These changes may be related to the increasing virulence of the virus strains, leading to more severe symptoms and higher infectivity of patients in the middle and late stage of the epidemic.20

• #53 Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)

  https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome

  SARS is a severe respiratory disease caused by a coronavirus (SARS-CoV-1). […] The first human cases appeared in China in November 2002, but the syndrome was recognized three months later. […] The virus generally spread from person to person through respiratory droplets (coughs and sneezes). […] The last SARS case in humans was detected in 2004. […] The source of SARS-CoV-1 is not completely known but it is believed that the virus jumped from an animal reservoir to humans. […] Bats are considered to be the natural reservoir of the virus, but some animals like civets and ferrets in southern China have been found to carry the virus. […] Recent experiments show that bats, ferrets, and domestic cats can efficiently transmit the virus, suggesting a wide range of animal species may act as sources of infection.

• #54 Epidemiology of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS): adults and children

  https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7106189/

  Among areas with larger outbreaks, Hong Kong and Canada had the highest case-fatality rate of 17%.13 Mortality is increased in those with pre-existing illness and those in the older age group. Young children had much milder disease and they usually recovered uneventfully. A small proportion of adolescent patients, however, may develop more severe disease similar to the disease in adults. In Hong Kong there were five pregnant women infected with SARS but none of the neonates was found to have evidence of infection after the delivery despite extensive investigations.14 […] With the advance of modern molecular biological techniques, scientists are able to trace the possible origin of the virus and the spread of infection. Early in the outbreak of SARS the WHO quickly established a laboratory network around the world to facilitate the collaboration in search of the responsible infectious agent.15 The causative agent of SARS was identified as a newly described strain of coronavirus.16, 17 Within just 2 months of the outbreak in Hong Kong, the genome of the virus was completely sequenced and it has very low homologies to all known coronaviruses.18 Subsequent investigations of wild animals and animal traders suggested that the virus originated from wild animals such as the palm civet and raccoon dog that have been hunted for consumption as a delicacy.19 Therefore, the SARS coronavirus most likely represents a new virus introduced to humans by interspecies transmission. From the genomic sequential analysis of 61 SARS coronavirus derived from the early, middle and late phase of the SARS epidemic in the mainland of China, it was again found that the earliest genotypes were similar to the animal SARS-like coronavirus. Major deletions were observed in the open reading frame 8 (Orf8) region of the genome, both at the start and the end of the epidemic. The neutral mutation rate of the viral genome was constant but the amino acid substitution rate of the coding sequences slowed down during the course of the epidemic. The spike protein showed the strongest initial responses to positive selection pressures, followed by subsequent purifying selection and eventual stabilisation. These changes may be related to the increasing virulence of the virus strains, leading to more severe symptoms and higher infectivity of patients in the middle and late stage of the epidemic.20

• #55

  https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11356-022-18868-x

  At the start of 2021, WHO sent a cohort of international scientists to undertake investigations into the origins of the virus. […] When a new pathogenic appears, discovering the source is important. […] Finding the source is also helpful in understanding the dynamics of the virus, which can help shape public health responses and can also be of assistance when developing therapies and vaccines. […] SARS-CoV-2 was initially identified in Wuhan, China, at the end of 2019, and swiftly spread to other nations through international travel networks. […] Published genetic sequences appear to show that the virus jumped from animals to humans in the last few months of 2019. […] The new coronavirus was confirmed as a human coronavirus by sequencing and analyzing its genome. […] The new virus shares similarity with a bat RaTG13 virus (96%), as well as with SARS-CoV (79%).

• #56 Epidemiology of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS): adults and children

  https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7106189/

  Among areas with larger outbreaks, Hong Kong and Canada had the highest case-fatality rate of 17%.13 Mortality is increased in those with pre-existing illness and those in the older age group. Young children had much milder disease and they usually recovered uneventfully. A small proportion of adolescent patients, however, may develop more severe disease similar to the disease in adults. In Hong Kong there were five pregnant women infected with SARS but none of the neonates was found to have evidence of infection after the delivery despite extensive investigations.14 […] With the advance of modern molecular biological techniques, scientists are able to trace the possible origin of the virus and the spread of infection. Early in the outbreak of SARS the WHO quickly established a laboratory network around the world to facilitate the collaboration in search of the responsible infectious agent.15 The causative agent of SARS was identified as a newly described strain of coronavirus.16, 17 Within just 2 months of the outbreak in Hong Kong, the genome of the virus was completely sequenced and it has very low homologies to all known coronaviruses.18 Subsequent investigations of wild animals and animal traders suggested that the virus originated from wild animals such as the palm civet and raccoon dog that have been hunted for consumption as a delicacy.19 Therefore, the SARS coronavirus most likely represents a new virus introduced to humans by interspecies transmission. From the genomic sequential analysis of 61 SARS coronavirus derived from the early, middle and late phase of the SARS epidemic in the mainland of China, it was again found that the earliest genotypes were similar to the animal SARS-like coronavirus. Major deletions were observed in the open reading frame 8 (Orf8) region of the genome, both at the start and the end of the epidemic. The neutral mutation rate of the viral genome was constant but the amino acid substitution rate of the coding sequences slowed down during the course of the epidemic. The spike protein showed the strongest initial responses to positive selection pressures, followed by subsequent purifying selection and eventual stabilisation. These changes may be related to the increasing virulence of the virus strains, leading to more severe symptoms and higher infectivity of patients in the middle and late stage of the epidemic.20

• #57 The next phase of SARS-CoV-2 surveillance: real-time molecular epidemiology | Nature Medicine

  https://www.nature.com/articles/s41591-021-01472-w

  The current coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic is the first to apply whole-genome sequencing near to real time, with over 2 million severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) whole-genome sequences generated and shared through the GISAID platform. […] This Review summarizes the genomic surveillance efforts as well as the current nomenclature and detection of variants of concern (VOC) and variants of interest (VOI). […] Virus genome sequencing has been increasingly used in recent years for outbreak research in the emerging disease field, as seen during the recent Ebola virus outbreak in Africa; however, the scale of genomic surveillance undertaken during the current pandemic is unprecedented. […] During the first year of the pandemic, a large number of SARS-CoV-2 whole-genome sequences were generated from all around the world and shared, mostly through GISAID.

• #58 Epidemiology of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS): adults and children

  https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7106189/

  Among areas with larger outbreaks, Hong Kong and Canada had the highest case-fatality rate of 17%.13 Mortality is increased in those with pre-existing illness and those in the older age group. Young children had much milder disease and they usually recovered uneventfully. A small proportion of adolescent patients, however, may develop more severe disease similar to the disease in adults. In Hong Kong there were five pregnant women infected with SARS but none of the neonates was found to have evidence of infection after the delivery despite extensive investigations.14 […] With the advance of modern molecular biological techniques, scientists are able to trace the possible origin of the virus and the spread of infection. Early in the outbreak of SARS the WHO quickly established a laboratory network around the world to facilitate the collaboration in search of the responsible infectious agent.15 The causative agent of SARS was identified as a newly described strain of coronavirus.16, 17 Within just 2 months of the outbreak in Hong Kong, the genome of the virus was completely sequenced and it has very low homologies to all known coronaviruses.18 Subsequent investigations of wild animals and animal traders suggested that the virus originated from wild animals such as the palm civet and raccoon dog that have been hunted for consumption as a delicacy.19 Therefore, the SARS coronavirus most likely represents a new virus introduced to humans by interspecies transmission. From the genomic sequential analysis of 61 SARS coronavirus derived from the early, middle and late phase of the SARS epidemic in the mainland of China, it was again found that the earliest genotypes were similar to the animal SARS-like coronavirus. Major deletions were observed in the open reading frame 8 (Orf8) region of the genome, both at the start and the end of the epidemic. The neutral mutation rate of the viral genome was constant but the amino acid substitution rate of the coding sequences slowed down during the course of the epidemic. The spike protein showed the strongest initial responses to positive selection pressures, followed by subsequent purifying selection and eventual stabilisation. These changes may be related to the increasing virulence of the virus strains, leading to more severe symptoms and higher infectivity of patients in the middle and late stage of the epidemic.20

• #59 SARS: symptoms, treatment, prevention – Institut Pasteur

  https://www.pasteur.fr/en/medical-center/disease-sheets/sars

  SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) was the first severe transmissible disease to emerge in the 21st century. The outbreak that began in China in late 2002 spread worldwide in 2003, with more than 8,000 cases and nearly 800 deaths. […] WHO considers the overall mortality rate to be 15%, although it can exceed 50% in people over the age of 65. […] SARS was soon identified as spreading between humans via airborne transmission, probably in droplets of contaminated saliva. It rapidly spread worldwide as a result of air transport, with the most significant outbreaks being concentrated in major airport hubs or areas with high population density. […] The international laboratory network (including the WHO Collaborating Center for Research and Reference on Influenza and Other Respiratory Viruses, in the Molecular Genetics of Respiratory Viruses Unit at the Institut Pasteur), tasked by WHO to identify the causative agent for SARS and to develop a diagnostic test, discovered a virus that was completely unknown to scientists.

• #60 Bat virus evolution suggests wildlife trade sparked COVID-19 virus emergence in humans | EurekAlert!

  https://www.eurekalert.org/news-releases/1082592

  Horseshoe bats are the main hosts of sarbecoviruses. These viruses dont harm the bats, but are thought to have made the leap to humans through zoonotic spillover events. Sarbecoviruses gave rise to severe acute respiratory syndrome-related coronaviruses including SARS-CoV-1, the strain that caused the SARS pandemic of 2002-2004, and SARS-CoV-2, the strain that resulted in the COVID-19 pandemic. […] The study found that sarbecoviruses related to SARS-CoV-1 and SARS-CoV-2 have circulated around Western China and Southeast Asia for millennia. […] In contrast, the analysis also revealed that the most recent sarbecovirus ancestors of both SARS-CoV-1 and SARS-CoV-2 left their points of origin less than 10 years before they were first reported to infect humans more than a thousand kilometers away.

• #61 Bat virus evolution suggests wildlife trade sparked COVID-19 virus emergence in humans | EurekAlert!

  https://www.eurekalert.org/news-releases/1082592

  The researchers calculated that given the distances that SARS-CoV-1 and SARS-CoV-2 would have had to cover so quickly, it is highly improbable that they could have been carried there via bat dispersal. Much more likely: they were transported there accidentally by wild animal traders via intermediate hosts. […] The findings dispute a widely circulated idea that SARS-CoV-1 emerged naturally, but SARS-CoV2 was the result of a lab leak. […] Zoonotic spillover events are on the rise worldwide due to an increase in human-animal interactions via the wildlife trade, as well as urbanization and habitat destruction. The researchers believe that by continuing to sample wild bat populations for sarbecoviruses, it may be possible to discover where the next coronavirus pandemic will come from. Whats more, understanding the evolutionary history of these viruses and other pathogens can help us prepare for and control future disease outbreaks.

• #62 Epidemiology of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS): adults and children

  https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7106189/

  Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is a newly described respiratory infection with pandemic potential. The causative agent is a new strain of coronavirus most likely originating from wild animals. This disease first emerged in November 2002 in Guangdong Province, China. Early in the outbreak the infection had been transmitted primarily via household contacts and healthcare settings. In late February 2003 the infection was transmitted to Hong Kong when an infected doctor from the mainland visited there. During his stay in Hong Kong at least 17 guests and visitors were infected at the hotel at which he stayed. By modern day air travel, the infection was rapidly spread to other countries including Vietnam, Singapore and Canada by these infected guests. With the implementation of effective control strategies including early isolation of suspected cases, strict infection control measures in the hospital setting, meticulous contact tracing and quarantine, the outbreak was finally brought under control by July 2003. In addition, there were another two events of SARS in China between the end of December 2003 and January 2004 and from March to May 2004; both were readily controlled without significant patient spread.

• #63 SARS – Wikipedia

  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SARS

  The World Health Organization declared severe acute respiratory syndrome contained on 5 July 2003. The containment was achieved through successful public health measures. While SARS-CoV-1 probably persists as a potential zoonotic threat in its original animal reservoir, human-to-human transmission of this virus may be considered eradicated because no human case has been documented since four minor, brief, subsequent outbreaks in 2004.

• #64 Epidemiology of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS): adults and children

  https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7106189/

  Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is a newly described respiratory infection with pandemic potential. The causative agent is a new strain of coronavirus most likely originating from wild animals. This disease first emerged in November 2002 in Guangdong Province, China. Early in the outbreak the infection had been transmitted primarily via household contacts and healthcare settings. In late February 2003 the infection was transmitted to Hong Kong when an infected doctor from the mainland visited there. During his stay in Hong Kong at least 17 guests and visitors were infected at the hotel at which he stayed. By modern day air travel, the infection was rapidly spread to other countries including Vietnam, Singapore and Canada by these infected guests. With the implementation of effective control strategies including early isolation of suspected cases, strict infection control measures in the hospital setting, meticulous contact tracing and quarantine, the outbreak was finally brought under control by July 2003. In addition, there were another two events of SARS in China between the end of December 2003 and January 2004 and from March to May 2004; both were readily controlled without significant patient spread.

• #65 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS): Lessons for Future Pandemics | Journal of Ethics | American Medical Association

  https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome-sars-lessons-future-pandemics/2010-09

  Based upon the case clusters from Hong Kong and Canada, SARS appears to spread from person to person and through face-to-face contact, suggesting droplet spread. During the Hong Kong outbreak, for example, almost one-half of patients were infected in clinics, hospitals, or nursing homes, most likely through small droplets that remain suspended in the air. SARS-virus RNA was detected on a variety of hospital surfaces, including computer mice and elevator handrails, during the outbreaks. This can be explained by the excretion of coronavirus in sputum, which can remain in the environment for up to 21 days, and vomit. Other possible transmission vectors are sewage and water, because SARS virus can be excreted in stool for several weeks after symptoms have resolved. […] The severity of SARS and its rapid spread highlighted the need for swift and drastic preventive methods. The WHO issued its first ever travel advisory against nonessential travel to Guangdong Province, China, and Hong Kong in April of 2003—a decision that was quickly supported by the CDC, who even broadened the restricted area and cautioned travelers to Toronto to avoid hospitals or other places in which SARS was likely to be transmitted. The CDC also advised travelers to carry materials for personal protection, such as surgical masks or alcohol-based hand rubs. By late June and early July 2003, the number of SARS cases worldwide had decreased through voluntary quarantines and strict infection control measures, and the WHO began lifting its travel advisories.

• #66 Azthena logo with the word Azthena

  https://www.news-medical.net/health/Severe-Acute-Respiratory-Syndrome.aspx

  By establishing three networks of virologists, clinicians, and epidemiologists, the causative agent for SARS was conclusively identified and this led to new knowledge about the disease, practical guidelines, recommended control measures and the rapid communication of information. […] It was found that the refinement of control strategies and their effective implementation including patient isolation, infection control, contact tracing, proper management of contacts, and restrictions on travel, proved effective in all affected countries, despite the diversity of health systems involved and differences in the severity and epidemiological characteristics of the outbreaks. […] SARS had demonstrated the need for better risk communication as a component of outbreak control and a strategy for reducing the health, economic, and psychosocial impact of major infectious disease events.

• #67 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS): Lessons for Future Pandemics | Journal of Ethics | American Medical Association

  https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome-sars-lessons-future-pandemics/2010-09

  Based upon the case clusters from Hong Kong and Canada, SARS appears to spread from person to person and through face-to-face contact, suggesting droplet spread. During the Hong Kong outbreak, for example, almost one-half of patients were infected in clinics, hospitals, or nursing homes, most likely through small droplets that remain suspended in the air. SARS-virus RNA was detected on a variety of hospital surfaces, including computer mice and elevator handrails, during the outbreaks. This can be explained by the excretion of coronavirus in sputum, which can remain in the environment for up to 21 days, and vomit. Other possible transmission vectors are sewage and water, because SARS virus can be excreted in stool for several weeks after symptoms have resolved. […] The severity of SARS and its rapid spread highlighted the need for swift and drastic preventive methods. The WHO issued its first ever travel advisory against nonessential travel to Guangdong Province, China, and Hong Kong in April of 2003—a decision that was quickly supported by the CDC, who even broadened the restricted area and cautioned travelers to Toronto to avoid hospitals or other places in which SARS was likely to be transmitted. The CDC also advised travelers to carry materials for personal protection, such as surgical masks or alcohol-based hand rubs. By late June and early July 2003, the number of SARS cases worldwide had decreased through voluntary quarantines and strict infection control measures, and the WHO began lifting its travel advisories.

• #68 A Visual Approach for the SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) Outbreak Data Analysis

  https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/17/11/3973

  In Table 6, from four features in Section 3, we compare and finalise five areas’ final peak periods, present in Table 7. From the discussions above, we believe that case data from Hong Kong and Singapore are the most comprehensive, and come with fewer issues. They all used strict social distancing measures, such as school closures, etc., in the SARS outbreak when there was no vaccine. […] Concerning our hypotheses, we can conclude: For H1, features such as peak period and prevention measures are compared in five areas. The peak periods are around 60 days in all countries and regions except Canada, who struggled in May and Jun; they all applied similar prevention measures such as quarantine, frequent hand washing, avoiding crowded places, non-essential activity, closure etc. However, implementation strictness is different, for example, Hong Kong and Singapore closed schools entirely, but Taiwan did not do the same thing at all.

• #69 A Visual Approach for the SARS (Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome) Outbreak Data Analysis

  https://www.mdpi.com/1660-4601/17/11/3973

  For H2, facts such as mortality rate, cured rate, outbreak days are compared in five areas. Results show that similar mortality rates occur in most areas except China, with cured rates varying between 70% and 80% and China at 92.2%. Areas with strict isolation measures tend to have higher cured rates, fewer peak periods and fewer days on the WHO’s list of areas with local transmission. […] For H3, authors are all in IT fields, far from the medical expert field, and those graphs do assist us in understanding the SARS outbreak and bringing fresh insights for us. […] For H4, as discussed above, Hong Kong and Singapore could be used as a good reference for SARS lifecycle analysis as they provided complete datasets with less data integrity issues, as well as applied strict measures, and had better outcomes.

• #70 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS): Lessons for Future Pandemics | Journal of Ethics | American Medical Association

  https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome-sars-lessons-future-pandemics/2010-09

  For any future outbreaks of SARS or similar respiratory illness, it will be imperative to isolate hospitalized patients in negative pressure rooms, which draw air in (rather than letting it out) when opened, helping to control contagion. Since the past outbreak was spread by HCWs, infection control measures, such as droplet precautions, are of particular importance. HCWs and visitors should wear surgical masks to prevent airborne and droplet acquisition; these can be discarded into the nonregulated waste stream if they do not have blood or bodily fluids on them. Furthermore, HCWs should be barred from work if they develop fever or respiratory symptoms within 10 days of exposure to SARS and should remain on sick leave for a full 10 days after fever and respiratory symptoms have resolved. However, HCWs are not advised to remain home during the 10-day incubation period for SARS if they have no symptoms.

• #71 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS): Lessons for Future Pandemics | Journal of Ethics | American Medical Association

  https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome-sars-lessons-future-pandemics/2010-09

  For any future outbreaks of SARS or similar respiratory illness, it will be imperative to isolate hospitalized patients in negative pressure rooms, which draw air in (rather than letting it out) when opened, helping to control contagion. Since the past outbreak was spread by HCWs, infection control measures, such as droplet precautions, are of particular importance. HCWs and visitors should wear surgical masks to prevent airborne and droplet acquisition; these can be discarded into the nonregulated waste stream if they do not have blood or bodily fluids on them. Furthermore, HCWs should be barred from work if they develop fever or respiratory symptoms within 10 days of exposure to SARS and should remain on sick leave for a full 10 days after fever and respiratory symptoms have resolved. However, HCWs are not advised to remain home during the 10-day incubation period for SARS if they have no symptoms.

• #72 Information Regarding Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) | Occupational Safety and Health Administration

  https://www.osha.gov/emergency-preparedness/sars

  The CDC provides recommendations for those handling human remains of SARS patients. […] All employees with potential occupational exposure to SARS, as described in this document, should be trained on the hazards associated with that exposure and on the protocols in place in their facilities to isolate and report cases and to reduce exposures. […] If an employee experiences a fever and respiratory symptoms after contact with a patient known to be infected with SARS, the CDC recommends that the employee be excluded from duty. […] As more information becomes available, updates may be added to information on the CDC’s SARS web site.

• #73 Information Regarding Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) | Occupational Safety and Health Administration

  https://www.osha.gov/emergency-preparedness/sars

  The CDC has reported very few cases of occupationally acquired SARS in the United States. The CDC is working in collaboration with state and local health departments to develop a systematic approach to survey SARS exposures and infection in healthcare workers. The CDC has issued a number of recommendations for healthcare workers who may have contact with a suspected SARS patient. […] Laboratory personnel in facilities performing diagnostic tests on patients suspected to be infected with SARS should follow biosafety preventive measures established by the CDC, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) – Laboratory Biosafety. […] The CDC has issued recommendations for aircraft crew members to follow for notifying a United States quarantine station if a passenger on an international flight returning to the United States is suspected of having SARS.

• #74 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS): Lessons for Future Pandemics | Journal of Ethics | American Medical Association

  https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome-sars-lessons-future-pandemics/2010-09

  For individuals with suspected SARS, the most important element of community infection control, according to the CDC, is to remain at home for a full 10 days after fever and symptoms resolve. Meanwhile, household contacts of the patient should practice strict hand washing and use gloves for contact with bodily fluids; utensils and bedding should not be shared without proper washing, and surgical masks should be considered for close contact between SARS patients and uninfected contacts. Like HCWs contacts, those of SARS patients may leave the home as long as they are asymptomatic.

• #75 Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS): MedlinePlus Medical EncyclopediaLock

  https://medlineplus.gov/ency/article/007192.htm

  Public health policies were effective at controlling outbreaks of SARS. Since 2004, there have been no cases of SARS reported anywhere in the world. […] Currently, there is no known SARS transmission anywhere in the world. If a SARS outbreak occurs, reducing your contact with people who have SARS lowers your risk for the disease. Avoid travel to places where there is an uncontrolled SARS outbreak. When possible, avoid direct contact with people who have SARS until at least 10 days after their fever and other symptoms are gone.

• #76 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) | American Lung Association

  https://www.lung.org/lung-health-diseases/lung-disease-lookup/severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome-sars

  Although there have been no cases of SARS anywhere in the world since 2004, preventing spread of this illness is similar to preventing any viral respiratory infection: avoid close contact with affected individuals, wash your hands with soap and water, and encourage people with viral respiratory infections to cover their mouth when coughing or sneezing. […] The World Health Organization (WHO) continues to monitor disease activity worldwide and has established guidelines for emergency preparedness and response should another SARS outbreak ever emerge.

• #77 Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS): MedlinePlus Medical EncyclopediaLock

  https://medlineplus.gov/ency/article/007192.htm

  Public health policies were effective at controlling outbreaks of SARS. Since 2004, there have been no cases of SARS reported anywhere in the world. […] Currently, there is no known SARS transmission anywhere in the world. If a SARS outbreak occurs, reducing your contact with people who have SARS lowers your risk for the disease. Avoid travel to places where there is an uncontrolled SARS outbreak. When possible, avoid direct contact with people who have SARS until at least 10 days after their fever and other symptoms are gone.

• #78 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) | HealthLink BC

  https://www.healthlinkbc.ca/healthwise/severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome-sars

  The incubation period—the time from when a person is first exposed to SARS until symptoms appear—is usually 3 to 7 days but may be as long as 10 days. […] Your doctor may suspect SARS if you have a fever and you either have travelled to a SARS-affected area or have in the past 10 days been around a person who has SARS. […] Severe cases of SARS often require a hospital stay, especially if breathing problems develop. […] About one-third (33 out of 100) of the people with SARS become ill and then recover. […] About 9 out of 10 people infected with SARS recover. […] The best way to prevent the spread of SARS is to avoid areas where there is an outbreak and avoid contact with people who may be infected. […] Researchers are currently trying to develop vaccines to prevent SARS infection.

• #79 Severe acute respiratory syndrome | Nature Medicine

  https://www.nature.com/articles/nm1143

  Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) was caused by a previously unrecognized animal coronavirus that exploited opportunities provided by 'wet markets’ in southern China to adapt to become a virus readily transmissible between humans. […] Hospitals and international travel proved to be 'amplifiers’ that permitted a local outbreak to achieve global dimensions. […] The concerted and coordinated response that contained SARS is a triumph for global public health and provides a new paradigm for the detection and control of future emerging infectious disease threats. […] Epidemiology and cause of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in Guangdong, People’s Republic of China, in February 2003. […] Epidemiology, transmission dynamics, and control of SARS. The 2002-2003 epidemic. […] Molecular epidemiology of SARS coronavirus in Hong Kong.

• #80 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS): Lessons for Future Pandemics | Journal of Ethics | American Medical Association

  https://journalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome-sars-lessons-future-pandemics/2010-09

  From November 2002 to July 2003, worldwide attention turned to cases of a rapidly progressive respiratory illness that spread through five continents. The regions most affected were Guangdong Province in China, Hong Kong, Vietnam, Singapore, and Canada. The illness was eventually named severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) by the World Health Organization (WHO), which launched major efforts to track cases, determine an etiology, establish a laboratory test for diagnosis, evaluate treatments, and test infection control strategies to prevent further spread. There were 8,447 cases and 813 deaths (9.6 percent overall mortality) by the time SARS was contained in July 2003. The case-fatality rate in 2003 was estimated at 13.2 percent for patients younger than 60 years and 50 percent for patients older than 60. Fifty percent of patients with SARS-related acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) died.

• #81 Epidemiology of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS): adults and children

  https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7106189/

  Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is the first new infection identified in the new millennium with a pandemic potential. This disease frequently leads to rapid deterioration, with a high case-fatality rate, especially in the elderly. For reasons that are still unclear, children tend to develop very mild disease and the majority recover uneventfully. Epidemiological studies revealed that the most likely route of transmission is by respiratory droplets. However, given the right environmental conditions, airborne transmission may be possible as illustrated by the outbreak at Amoy Gardens in Hong Kong. Similar to epidemics caused by new strains of influenza, SARS coronavirus is most likely to originate from animal species. Health authorities will have to evaluate the risk of allowing sales of wild animals for human consumption as well as the operations of wet markets in China and other Asian countries. As illustrated by the recent cases of transmission from the laboratory, appropriate control measures in the laboratory are necessary to prevent the spread of SARS or similar infections into the community.22, 23

• #82 Azthena logo with the word Azthena

  https://www.news-medical.net/health/Severe-Acute-Respiratory-Syndrome.aspx

  By establishing three networks of virologists, clinicians, and epidemiologists, the causative agent for SARS was conclusively identified and this led to new knowledge about the disease, practical guidelines, recommended control measures and the rapid communication of information. […] It was found that the refinement of control strategies and their effective implementation including patient isolation, infection control, contact tracing, proper management of contacts, and restrictions on travel, proved effective in all affected countries, despite the diversity of health systems involved and differences in the severity and epidemiological characteristics of the outbreaks. […] SARS had demonstrated the need for better risk communication as a component of outbreak control and a strategy for reducing the health, economic, and psychosocial impact of major infectious disease events.

• #83 Epidemiology of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS): adults and children

  https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7106189/

  Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) is the first new infection identified in the new millennium with a pandemic potential. This disease frequently leads to rapid deterioration, with a high case-fatality rate, especially in the elderly. For reasons that are still unclear, children tend to develop very mild disease and the majority recover uneventfully. Epidemiological studies revealed that the most likely route of transmission is by respiratory droplets. However, given the right environmental conditions, airborne transmission may be possible as illustrated by the outbreak at Amoy Gardens in Hong Kong. Similar to epidemics caused by new strains of influenza, SARS coronavirus is most likely to originate from animal species. Health authorities will have to evaluate the risk of allowing sales of wild animals for human consumption as well as the operations of wet markets in China and other Asian countries. As illustrated by the recent cases of transmission from the laboratory, appropriate control measures in the laboratory are necessary to prevent the spread of SARS or similar infections into the community.22, 23

• #84 CEUFast – Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)

  https://ceufast.com/course/severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome-sars

  The mortality rate of SARS victims causes great concern. Approximately 45% of individuals over 60 and with co-morbid conditions such as diabetes, renal failure and other chronic illnesses died when they became infected with the SARS virus. […] SARS taught the world that cooperation is mandatory in order to identify and eliminate an infectious disease. Further, SARS underscored that global health is a national security issue for the United States and that health concerns have significant economic implications. […] The CDC response included the following actions: activated the Emergency Operations Center for round-the-clock coordination and response, committed more than 800 experts and support staff to work on SARS, deployed specialists to conduct on-site investigations around the world, assisted state and local health departments in their investigation efforts, provided extensive laboratory testing of specimens, distributed health alerts to travelers, and continues to work with experts to plan for rapid response if resurgence occurs.

• #85 Azthena logo with the word Azthena

  https://www.news-medical.net/health/Severe-Acute-Respiratory-Syndrome.aspx

  By establishing three networks of virologists, clinicians, and epidemiologists, the causative agent for SARS was conclusively identified and this led to new knowledge about the disease, practical guidelines, recommended control measures and the rapid communication of information. […] It was found that the refinement of control strategies and their effective implementation including patient isolation, infection control, contact tracing, proper management of contacts, and restrictions on travel, proved effective in all affected countries, despite the diversity of health systems involved and differences in the severity and epidemiological characteristics of the outbreaks. […] SARS had demonstrated the need for better risk communication as a component of outbreak control and a strategy for reducing the health, economic, and psychosocial impact of major infectious disease events.

• #86 Epidemiology of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS): adults and children

  https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7106189/

  There were two events of SARS in the mainland of China following the first outbreak in 2003. Four new cases of SARS emerged from the end of December 2003 to January 2004. The S-gene sequence analysis of the coronavirus from the throat specimen isolated from the first case again showed high homology with that from the civet cat (Guan Y, personal communication). The second case was a waitress working at a restaurant where wildlife animals were processed as game food. A close linkage of SARS-CoV between human beings and small wild mammals, in particular civet cats, was suspected. In addition, as game foods are considered to enhance the vitality of the body, the Cantonese consumed them in substantial amounts and wildlife markets blossom each year during the cold weather, facilitating more possible cross infection of SARS from wildlife to humans. Early in 2004 the Guangdong government and the Department of Public Health took strong actions to control the wildlife market, including cessation of rearing, sales, transport, slaughter and food processing of small wild mammals, civet cats in particular. Seventeen rearing farms were closed within 5 days. All suspected cases of infection were isolated immediately and all close contacts were put under quarantine. This control strategy seems to be working and there have not been any new cases since Jan 30, 2004 in Guangdong.

• #87 Epidemiology of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS): adults and children

  https://pmc.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/articles/PMC7106189/

  There were two events of SARS in the mainland of China following the first outbreak in 2003. Four new cases of SARS emerged from the end of December 2003 to January 2004. The S-gene sequence analysis of the coronavirus from the throat specimen isolated from the first case again showed high homology with that from the civet cat (Guan Y, personal communication). The second case was a waitress working at a restaurant where wildlife animals were processed as game food. A close linkage of SARS-CoV between human beings and small wild mammals, in particular civet cats, was suspected. In addition, as game foods are considered to enhance the vitality of the body, the Cantonese consumed them in substantial amounts and wildlife markets blossom each year during the cold weather, facilitating more possible cross infection of SARS from wildlife to humans. Early in 2004 the Guangdong government and the Department of Public Health took strong actions to control the wildlife market, including cessation of rearing, sales, transport, slaughter and food processing of small wild mammals, civet cats in particular. Seventeen rearing farms were closed within 5 days. All suspected cases of infection were isolated immediately and all close contacts were put under quarantine. This control strategy seems to be working and there have not been any new cases since Jan 30, 2004 in Guangdong.

• #88 Pathogen Safety Data Sheets: Infectious Substances – Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) associated coronavirus – Canada.ca

  https://www.canada.ca/en/public-health/services/laboratory-biosafety-biosecurity/pathogen-safety-data-sheets-risk-assessment/severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome-sars-associated-coronavirus.html

  Epidemiology: SARS-CoV is a novel virus that caused the first major pandemic of the new millennium. The earliest known cases were identified in mid-November 2002 in the Guangdong Province of South-East China. The index case was reported in Foshan, a city 24 km from Guangzhou. Retrospective analysis revealed severe cases of the disease in 5 cities around Guangzhou over a period of 2 months, with many of the cases having had epidemiological links to the live-animal market trade. […] By the end of July 2003, SARS had spread to affect a reported 8,098 people in over 30 countries, across 5 continents, killing 774 people. Over half of these infections can be traced back to 1 index patient who arrived in Hong Kong on February 21, 2003, and 21% of all cases were healthcare workers. Although the World Health Organization declared the end of the SARS epidemic in early July 2003, sporadic outbreaks of SARS occurred in late 2003 and early 2004, due to laboratory incidents and community-acquired SARS in the city of Guangzhou, China.

• #89 Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS)

  https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome

  SARS is a severe respiratory disease caused by a coronavirus (SARS-CoV-1). […] The first human cases appeared in China in November 2002, but the syndrome was recognized three months later. […] The virus generally spread from person to person through respiratory droplets (coughs and sneezes). […] The last SARS case in humans was detected in 2004. […] The source of SARS-CoV-1 is not completely known but it is believed that the virus jumped from an animal reservoir to humans. […] Bats are considered to be the natural reservoir of the virus, but some animals like civets and ferrets in southern China have been found to carry the virus. […] Recent experiments show that bats, ferrets, and domestic cats can efficiently transmit the virus, suggesting a wide range of animal species may act as sources of infection.

• #90 SARS: Causes, symptoms, and prevention

  https://www.medicalnewstoday.com/articles/7543

  Severe acute respiratory syndrome, or SARS, was a contagious and potentially fatal respiratory illness. An outbreak occurred from 2002 to 2003, but the disease is no longer circulating. […] SARS spread to over 24 countries before health authorities managed to contain it. Nevertheless, between November 2002 to July 2003, there were 8,098 cases worldwide and 774 deaths. […] Global cooperation enabled health authorities to deal swiftly with the threat of SARS and to rapidly contain the illness. SARS infections are not occurring now, although they could reappear one day. […] SARS was a zoonotic disease, meaning it was of animal origin but passed on to humans. […] SARS appeared to be contagious only after symptoms emerged, and it was most likely to spread during the second week of illness, according to the CDC. […] A SARS outbreak occurred in 2002-2003. It resulted from SARS-CoV, a coronavirus related to the virus responsible for the current COVID-19 pandemic. […] Since 2004, there have been no recorded cases of SARS anywhere in the world.

• #91 Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) | American Lung Association

  https://www.lung.org/lung-health-diseases/lung-disease-lookup/severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome-sars

  Although there have been no cases of SARS anywhere in the world since 2004, preventing spread of this illness is similar to preventing any viral respiratory infection: avoid close contact with affected individuals, wash your hands with soap and water, and encourage people with viral respiratory infections to cover their mouth when coughing or sneezing. […] The World Health Organization (WHO) continues to monitor disease activity worldwide and has established guidelines for emergency preparedness and response should another SARS outbreak ever emerge.

• #92 Severe acute respiratory syndrome | Nature Medicine

  https://www.nature.com/articles/nm1143

  Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) was caused by a previously unrecognized animal coronavirus that exploited opportunities provided by 'wet markets’ in southern China to adapt to become a virus readily transmissible between humans. […] Hospitals and international travel proved to be 'amplifiers’ that permitted a local outbreak to achieve global dimensions. […] The concerted and coordinated response that contained SARS is a triumph for global public health and provides a new paradigm for the detection and control of future emerging infectious disease threats. […] Epidemiology and cause of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in Guangdong, People’s Republic of China, in February 2003. […] Epidemiology, transmission dynamics, and control of SARS. The 2002-2003 epidemic. […] Molecular epidemiology of SARS coronavirus in Hong Kong.

• #93 Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) mathematical models and disease parameters: a systematic review and meta-analysis | medRxiv

  https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2024.08.13.24311934v1

  We conducted a systematic review (PROSPERO CRD42023393345) of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) transmission models and parameters characterising its transmission, evolution, natural history, severity, risk factors and seroprevalence. Information was extracted using a custom database and quality assessment tool. […] We extracted 519 parameters, 243 risk factors, and 112 models from 288 papers. Our analyses show SARS is characterised by high lethality (case fatality ratio 10.9%), transmissibility (R0 range 1.1-4.59), and is prone to superspreading (20% top infectors causing up to 91% of infections). Infection risk was highest among healthcare workers and close contacts of infected individuals. Severe disease and death were associated with age and existing comorbidities. SARSs natural history is poorly characterised, except for the incubation period and mean onset-to-hospitalisation. […] Our associated R package, epireview, contains this database, which can continue to be updated to maintain a living review of SARS epidemiology and models, thus providing a key resource for informing response to future coronavirus outbreaks.

• #94 CEUFast – Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)

  https://ceufast.com/course/severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome-sars

  The mortality rate of SARS victims causes great concern. Approximately 45% of individuals over 60 and with co-morbid conditions such as diabetes, renal failure and other chronic illnesses died when they became infected with the SARS virus. […] SARS taught the world that cooperation is mandatory in order to identify and eliminate an infectious disease. Further, SARS underscored that global health is a national security issue for the United States and that health concerns have significant economic implications. […] The CDC response included the following actions: activated the Emergency Operations Center for round-the-clock coordination and response, committed more than 800 experts and support staff to work on SARS, deployed specialists to conduct on-site investigations around the world, assisted state and local health departments in their investigation efforts, provided extensive laboratory testing of specimens, distributed health alerts to travelers, and continues to work with experts to plan for rapid response if resurgence occurs.

• #95 CEUFast – Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)

  https://ceufast.com/course/severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome-sars

  The mortality rate of SARS victims causes great concern. Approximately 45% of individuals over 60 and with co-morbid conditions such as diabetes, renal failure and other chronic illnesses died when they became infected with the SARS virus. […] SARS taught the world that cooperation is mandatory in order to identify and eliminate an infectious disease. Further, SARS underscored that global health is a national security issue for the United States and that health concerns have significant economic implications. […] The CDC response included the following actions: activated the Emergency Operations Center for round-the-clock coordination and response, committed more than 800 experts and support staff to work on SARS, deployed specialists to conduct on-site investigations around the world, assisted state and local health departments in their investigation efforts, provided extensive laboratory testing of specimens, distributed health alerts to travelers, and continues to work with experts to plan for rapid response if resurgence occurs.

• #96 Severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) mathematical models and disease parameters: a systematic review and meta-analysis | medRxiv

  https://www.medrxiv.org/content/10.1101/2024.08.13.24311934v1

  We conducted a systematic review (PROSPERO CRD42023393345) of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) transmission models and parameters characterising its transmission, evolution, natural history, severity, risk factors and seroprevalence. Information was extracted using a custom database and quality assessment tool. […] We extracted 519 parameters, 243 risk factors, and 112 models from 288 papers. Our analyses show SARS is characterised by high lethality (case fatality ratio 10.9%), transmissibility (R0 range 1.1-4.59), and is prone to superspreading (20% top infectors causing up to 91% of infections). Infection risk was highest among healthcare workers and close contacts of infected individuals. Severe disease and death were associated with age and existing comorbidities. SARSs natural history is poorly characterised, except for the incubation period and mean onset-to-hospitalisation. […] Our associated R package, epireview, contains this database, which can continue to be updated to maintain a living review of SARS epidemiology and models, thus providing a key resource for informing response to future coronavirus outbreaks.

• #97 CEUFast – Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS)

  https://ceufast.com/course/severe-acute-respiratory-syndrome-sars

  The mortality rate of SARS victims causes great concern. Approximately 45% of individuals over 60 and with co-morbid conditions such as diabetes, renal failure and other chronic illnesses died when they became infected with the SARS virus. […] SARS taught the world that cooperation is mandatory in order to identify and eliminate an infectious disease. Further, SARS underscored that global health is a national security issue for the United States and that health concerns have significant economic implications. […] The CDC response included the following actions: activated the Emergency Operations Center for round-the-clock coordination and response, committed more than 800 experts and support staff to work on SARS, deployed specialists to conduct on-site investigations around the world, assisted state and local health departments in their investigation efforts, provided extensive laboratory testing of specimens, distributed health alerts to travelers, and continues to work with experts to plan for rapid response if resurgence occurs.

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